A theoretical Analysis of the corporate Contingent Governance
相机治理(The Contingent Governance)理论最早是由日本学者青木昌彦(Aoki,1994)提出。他认为，为了有效防止企业生产、经营和管理过程中的“道德风险”和“逆向选择”问题，一个有效的办法是：当企业处于正常经营状态时，由企业内部人掌握控制权，当企业进入非正常经营状态(比如进入破产程序)时，控制权应由内部人向股东、债权人、职工等其他利益相关者进行转移。
The Contingent Governance was first proposed by the Japanese scholar Aoki (Aoki, 1994) . He believes that, in order to effectively prevent the “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” problems in the process of production, operation and management, an effective approach is this: when the enterprise is in the normal operating state, the control should be in the hands of the insiders of the enterprise; when the enterprise is in the abnormal operating state (such as in the bankruptcy proceedings), the control should be transferred from insiders to such stakeholders as shareholders, creditors, employees.
In 1994(Aoki, 1994) and his later articles (Aoki, 1995)  Aoki named this form of governance state in which the control, contingent on the state of business, will be transferred accordingly the Contingent Governance. Weiying Zhang(1996) , based on this model, gives a further explanation of this theory with the theory of state dependent control，According to Zhang’s model, when the total revenue of the enterprise is greater than the sum of workers’ payroll, the contract revenue of creditors and the lowest expected profits of the shareholders, the control of the enterprise should be in the hands of management; when the total revenue of the enterprise is greater than the sum of workers’ payroll and the contract revenue of creditors, yet less than the sum of workers’ payroll, the contract revenue of creditors and the lowest expected profits of the shareholders, the enterprise should be controlled by the shareholder; If the enterprise’s total revenue is greater than the payroll, but less than the sum of workers’ payroll and the contract revenue of creditors, the creditors should be in control of the enterprise; and if the company’s total revenue is not enough to pay the wages of the workers, then the control of the business should be transferred to the workers.
But Yang Ruilong and Zhou Yean (Yang Ruilong, Zhou Yean, 1998)  believe that the dependency state of the corporate control does not mean the automatic transfer of control. For example, when the total revenue of the enterprise is less than the sum of workers’ wages and the principal and interest of creditors, will the shareholders take the initiative to transfer the control to the creditors? The answer is uncertain. So Yang and Zhou think that a system or a prior contract should be devised (as in the Bankruptcy Law or the corresponding regulations in the debt covenants) to ensure the smooth transfer of corporate control.